



Loch Ewe Operational Berth Off-Site Emergency Plan



REPPiR



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1 SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 AIM & OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN

The aim of this Off-Site Emergency Plan is to set out the arrangements for the effective, coordinated multi-agency response to a radiation emergency at the Loch Ewe Operational Berth, in order to protect the public, responders, property and the environment.

The objectives of the plan are to:

- establish clear roles, responsibilities and command structures for responding organisations
- enable the timely assessment of an emergency situation and potential off-site impacts
- support the prompt implementation of proportionate protective actions to reduce radiation exposure
- ensure effective warning and informing of the public
- facilitate the transition from response to recovery, where required
- meet the requirements of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPPiR)

1.2 SCOPE OF THE PLAN

This plan applies to off-site arrangements for responding to a radiation emergency associated with nuclear-powered warships visiting or operating at the Loch Ewe Operational Berth. It covers the actions required following the declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) and focuses on preparedness, response, and recovery activities affecting areas beyond the

operator's site boundary, including the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ).

The plan does not replace on-site emergency arrangements, which are maintained separately by the operator, but is designed to interface directly with those arrangements to ensure a coordinated response.

1.3 RELATED PLANS, GUIDANCE AND RELEVANT RESOURCES

This plan should be read in conjunction with:

- The MOD Site Specific Operators Emergency Plan (SSOEP) for Loch Ewe
- The Highland and Islands Local Resilience Partnership Response and Recovery Arrangements
- The North of Scotland RRP Public Communications Plan
- The UK Government Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance
- national guidance including Preparing Scotland
- other supporting agency procedures, responder plans and communication protocols.

Together, these documents provide the strategic, tactical and operational framework for managing a radiation emergency at Loch Ewe.

2 SECTION TWO: SITE OVERVIEW

2.1 SITE CONTACT DETAILS

SITE	TELEPHONE NUMBER
HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE (FASLANE)	01436 674321

2.2 LOCH EWE OPERATIONAL BERTH INFORMATION

Loch Ewe is a Wester Ross Sea loch opening into The Minch. It plays host to a nuclear operational berth (OB), located at The Oil and Pipeline Agency, Oil Fuel Depot, Loch Ewe Jetty, Wester Ross.

An OB is a location which is endorsed by Navy Command and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) as being suitable for operational visits or stand offs by nuclear powered warships. It is not suitable for the repair of nuclear plant or machinery, and such uses would require the prior approval of DNSR.

No nuclear work routinely takes place on submarines while berthed in Loch Ewe.

At OB's, which are used only infrequently, there is no resident monitoring capability but a team of the Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Organisation (NEMO), a Health Physics Advisor and a Technical Adviser will be co-located throughout the period the berth is occupied.

2.3 RISK CONTEXT

The Operator's most recent review under REPPIR Regulation 6 confirmed that there has been **no change of circumstances** affecting the hazard basis for Loch Ewe. The generic Nuclear Steam Raising Plant (NSRP) Hazard Evaluation and Consequence Assessment (HECA)—which assesses potential reactor fault conditions leading to fuel damage and fission product release—was updated and approved through the Naval Reactor Plant Approving Authority process in 2021 and continues to form the bounding case for all Operational Berths.

This generic assessment is complemented by the site-specific Berth Safety Statement (BSS), which evaluates external hazards at Loch Ewe such as NPW berthing and movements, nearby vessel and aircraft activity, and local infrastructure. The most recent review of the BSS identified **no material changes** to site conditions and no factors that would alter the 2019 Consequences Report.

Together, the updated NSRP HECA and reviewed BSS continue to underpin the REPPIR risk framework for the berth, and the Operator has formally declared that **no changes are required to the existing Consequences Report recommendations**.


2.4 CENTRES OF POPULATION NEARBY

LOCATION	POPULATION	DISTANCE FROM LOCH EWE JETTY BERTH (KM)
Loch Ewe – Immediate areas adjacent to the berth, area	Nil	With 0.4 km of the OB
Loch Ewe – immediate areas of the berth	134	Within 1.5km of OB
Loch Ewe – total out to 20km	3098	Within all area of the Loch
Aultbea	48	1.5
Mellon Udrigle	32	8.5
Laide	134	5.5
Talladale	14	18
Poolewe	264	7
Gairloch	820	12
Isle of Ewe	10	2
Mellon Charles	146	4.5

Source: 2025 Highland Council population estimates for settlements.

3 SECTION THREE: DEPZ OVERVIEW

3.1 MAP OF THE DETAILED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (DEPZ)



3.2 DEPZ OVERVIEW

The Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) for Loch Ewe is defined as the area extending to 1.5 kilometres downwind from the Nuclear-Powered Warship (NPW) Operational Berth, based on the hazard identification and consequence assessments for credible Representative Accident scenarios, in accordance with the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPPIR).

The DEPZ reflects the nature of the potential radiological hazards, local geography, prevailing meteorological conditions and the distribution of the resident population, and identifies the area within which urgent off-site protective actions may be required to prevent or significantly reduce public exposure.

The arrangements for the implementation of proportionate protective actions within the DEPZ, including sheltering and the administration of stable iodine tablets where advised, are specified in **Section 6: Initial Considerations** of this plan. Within the DEPZ, enhanced emergency preparedness arrangements are maintained to support effective public warning and information and coordinated multi-agency response.

3.3 VULNERABLE PEOPLE IN THE DEPZ

The vulnerable groups within the DEPZ 1.5km boundary are shown below.

For the purposes of this document ‘Other Facilities of Interest’ have also been included. For further information on all these groups, please see tables below –

VULNERABLE GROUPS	
SITE	PLANNED ACTION
Isle View Nursing Care Home	Shelter or move to suitable alternative accommodation, subject to circumstances.
Aultbea School Nursery	Relocate to Bualnaluib Primary School. Consider issuing of Stable Iodine Tablets (SITs).

OTHER ‘FACILITIES OF INTEREST’ IN THE SURROUNDING AREA OF THE OPERATIONAL BERTH		
FACILITY	DISTANCE	INFORMATION
Bualnaluib Primary School	2.4km	23 pupils, 2 teachers. Designated relocation site for nursery.

3.3.1 PUBLIC PROTECTIVE ACTIONS IN THE DEPZ

Due to the small population and local geography, the public protection measures will be applied for the entire DEPZ. Anyone living or working within the DEPZ will be advised to take shelter by remaining indoors with doors and windows closed, and shut off ventilation systems, until monitoring results have confirmed the extent of any release of radioactive material. A Public Information leaflet '*What to do in a Radiation Emergency*' has been routinely issued to all households in the DEPZ and it details actions the public should take.

3.3.2 STABLE IODINE TABLETS (SITs)

It is the policy of NHS Highland that SITs are pre-distributed to the public living in the DEPZ. Advice to take these will **ONLY** be on the agreement/advice of the Strategic Coordinating Group within the SCC. Further instructions from the Director of Public Health Medicine will be promulgated during the course of the emergency.

MoD and Highland Council retain copies of the list of addresses within the DEPZ to which SITs have been pre-distributed.

A stock of SITs is held by MoD at the Oil Fuel Depot. These can be distributed by naval personnel to addresses within the DEPZ requiring SITs.

4 SECTION FOUR: ASSESSMENT AND ACTIVATION

4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT

The only reactor emergency that can result in a radiological hazard to personnel beyond the Nuclear-Powered Warship (NPW) is one that leads to a significant release of fission products normally retained within the reactor fuel.

For the purposes of this plan, the following definitions apply:

EVENT	DEFINITIONS
REACTOR SAFETY ALERT (RSA)	An abnormal event which poses a potential threat to, or causes serious concern for, reactor plant safety.
OFF-SITE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY (OSNE)	A hazardous condition which requires the implementation of urgent protective actions to protect the public.
OSNE QUALIFIERS	Radiation Hazard Confirmed – an off-site Nuclear Emergency in which a radiation hazard has been detected.
	Release of Radioactive Material Confirmed – an off-site nuclear emergency in which a release of radioactive material to the environment has been detected.

4.2 RISK MANAGEMENT

In the event of an OSNE, emergency procedures will be implemented by the submarine crew and shore engineering support with the objective of preventing or minimising core damage and maintaining containment integrity to prevent or limit any release of fission products.

These on-site control measures form a critical component of the overall protection of the public, working in parallel with off-site assessment, monitoring and protective action planning.

Should a radiation hazard be detected external to the submarine, the early stages of the emergency may present significant risk to personnel approaching the vessel. Nevertheless, intervention activities may be undertaken by MOD personnel where necessary to mitigate the consequences of the emergency or to assist endangered persons. All such activities will be conducted under strict radiological and procedural controls, informed by specialist advice.

The development of the emergency and the scale, timing and nature of any release will be evaluated through radiation monitoring carried out in the vicinity of the emergency site. It is recognised that several hours may be required to obtain sufficiently robust data to characterise the situation fully. Accordingly, pre-determined protective actions must be available for implementation during the period of uncertainty before definitive monitoring information becomes available.

The declaration of an OSNE signifies that off-site protective actions may be required and will initiate the activation of the off-site emergency arrangements described within this plan.

4.3 ACTIVATION OF THE OFF-SITE PLAN

Activation of the Off-Site Emergency Plan occurs on the formal declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) by the Ministry of Defence, based on advice from the Submarine Commanding Officer and specialist technical advisers.

Upon declaration, HM Naval Base Clyde immediately notifies Police Scotland's Control Room, which initiates the wider emergency notification cascade, the activation of the off-site arrangements and the establishment of the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC). The SCC may be established virtually, hybrid or in-person depending on circumstances, as appropriate.

The off-site response is then coordinated in accordance with this plan, on a multi-agency basis from the SCC, with strategic and tactical groups overseeing the implementation of proportionate public protective actions. The emergency phase is coordinated by Police Scotland, with responsibility transferring to The Highland Council Chief Executive, or nominated representative, during recovery. Recovery planning is initiated immediately through the establishment of a multi-agency Recovery Coordinating Group. Health protection advice will be provided by the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), chaired by NHS Highland.

4.4 NOTIFICATION AND CASCADE

4.4.1 CASCADE CALLOUT LIST

The following agencies will **always** be called out on the declaration of an OSNE -

- Police Scotland
- Scottish Fire and Rescue Service
- Scottish Ambulance Service
- The Highland Council
- NHS Highland
- Scottish Government
- Met Office
- HM Coastguard (HMCG)
- Scottish Water
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency
- United Kingdom Health Security Agency – Radiation, Chemical, Climate & Environmental Hazards Directorate (UKHSA – RCCE)
- Food Standards Agency
- Food Standards Scotland
- Office of Nuclear Regulations

5 SECTION FIVE: INITIAL RESPONSE


5.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL

5.1.1 RESPONSE STRUCTURE

Fundamental to successful command and control will be the co-ordination of all responder agency services. This will require a recognised and easily understood structure, based on the three levels of command which should be applied to each responding agency. These are:

- **Operational**
- **Tactical**
- **Strategic**

The following diagram which sets out the generic response structure and basic responsibilities is taken from *JESIP Joint Doctrine* guidance:



5.2 OPERATIONAL RESPONSE

In the early stages of a radiation emergency at the Loch Ewe Operational Berth, multi-agency operational activity will focus on establishing safe control of the scene, confirming the location and nature of hazards, and initiating urgent protective actions. Responders will operate in line with the

Highland and Islands Local Resilience Partnership (HILRP) Response and Recovery Arrangements and JESIP Joint Doctrine, using M/ETHANE to establish a shared situational picture.

Operational commanders from Police Scotland, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, Scottish Ambulance Service, the MOD, and other partner agencies will initially operate under their own agency procedures and delegated authority until Tactical and Strategic command structures are established.

A Forward Control Point and Rendezvous Point will be established at a suitable upwind location, informed by prevailing meteorological conditions. The on-site Incident Control Centre will be operated by MOD personnel in accordance with the Operator's On-Site Emergency Plan, including personnel accountability, alerting arrangements, and the management of site-based protective measures.

Early scene management will include the establishment of inner and outer cordons and access control points to control ingress, ensure responder safety, and restrict public movement into hazard areas.

Scottish Ambulance Service will identify appropriate receiving hospitals for casualties requiring radiological assessment or specialist care. Emergency Support Centres for displaced or affected members of the public will be identified as required, agreed jointly by The Highland Council, NHS Highland, and Police Scotland, and supported by voluntary agencies.

These operational arrangements will remain in place until multi-agency Tactical and Strategic Coordinating Groups are fully established to manage the wider off-site response from the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) in Inverness.

5.3 OFF-SITE EMERGENCY COORDINATING CENTRE

The co-ordination of the emergency response is the role of Police Scotland. To achieve this, Police Scotland, will appoint a Strategic Commander to co-ordinate the activities of the Local Resilience Partnership (LRP). A Police Tactical Commander will also be appointed to co-ordinate the tactical elements of the emergency response.

Agencies which **will or may** be represented at the SCC include: -

- Office for Nuclear Regulation
- HM Naval Base Clyde - MOD Co-ordinating Authority
- Ministry of Defence
- Police Scotland
- Scottish Fire and Rescue Service
- Scottish Ambulance Service
- The Highland Council
- NHS Highland
- Scottish Government
- HM Coastguard
- Scottish Water
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency - SEPA
- United Kingdom Health Security Agency – Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards Directorate (UKHSA – RCE)
- Food Standards Scotland
- Met Office

Once the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) have assessed the situation the following agencies may also attend at the if required -

- Marine Directorate

- Animal and Plant Health Agency

5.3.1 ROLES / MEMBERSHIP OF DECISION MAKING AND ADVISORY GROUPS

The purpose of this section is to clarify the role and composition of the various decision making and advisory groups and their interface during the emergency phase of an incident.

5.3.1.1 STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (SCG)

This senior group will **only** be composed of members whose role it is to make strategic decisions on behalf of their organisation. The group must be **small and dynamic**, coming together for focused meetings, and armed with sufficient information from their own agency to allow group strategic issues to be discussed and decisions made.

Therefore, the Chair must be proactive in politely asking anyone who shouldn't be there to leave. Membership of the SCG should include:

Police Scotland, Strategic Commander (Chief Constable or Duty ACC)

- Chairs the SCG and co-ordinates the emergency response phase, towards the restoration of normality.

Police Scotland, Tactical Commander ('N' Division Commander or Representative)

- Informs the SCG of all issues arising from the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) requiring strategic direction and implements the decisions of the SCG.

Police Scotland, Public Communications Group (PCG) Chair

- Advises the SCG on any key issues of public/media concern from all agencies and on the media/information strategy. Also, implements decisions of the SCG dissemination of information to the public.

The Highland Council, Chief Executive (or Nominated Representative)

- Responsible for overseeing arrangements for Council support to the Emergency Services, and NHS Highland in their lead role for Care for People arrangements.

The Highland Council, Recovery Coordinating Group Chair

NHS Highland, Chief Executive (or Nominated Representative)

NHS Highland, STAC Chair

- Co-ordinates and manages the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), they advise the SCG on the effects of the emergency and the appropriate protective actions to be implemented to protect the public.

MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA) Representative (HM Naval Base Clyde)

- The MCA is the appointed Nuclear Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person (NSQEP) Executive Director of the MOD's operational response in the Clyde area. Providing detailed onsite information to the SCG Commander on arrival and establishes and maintains effective liaison and support throughout.

Scottish Fire and Rescue, Strategic Commander (Duty Gold)

- Advises the SCG on the SFRS capabilities and capacities and the wider UK FRS capabilities. Provides FRS strategic overview to enable suitable strategic decisions to be made.

Scottish Ambulance Service, Strategic Commander (Duty Gold)

- Advises the SCG on local SAS capabilities and capacities and the wider SAS capabilities. Provides SAS strategic overview to enable suitable strategic decisions to be made.

Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Representative

Office for Nuclear Regulation, Representative

Scottish Government, Civil Contingencies Liaison Officer (SGCCLO)

- Provides advice and support to responder organisations on devolved matters, liaising with the Scottish Government Resilience Room – (SGoRR).

IN ADDITION

The following officials **will not** sit at the table, but **may** be required to support their Strategic representative:

- Police Scotland, Emergencies Procedure Adviser;
- The Highland Council, Emergency Planning Officer
- NHS Highland, Resilience Team Member

SCG meetings must be timed to support members' attendance at TCG, STAC and RCG meetings.

Chair of the meeting **may** invite other agencies to attend the SCG if Strategic input is required.

In the recovery phase, **after a formal handover to the Chief Executive of the Local Authority**, all the above agencies will still be represented, but in the case of the Police, at a less senior level.

5.3.1.2 TACTICAL COORDINATING GROUP (TCG)

The TCG will be chaired by the Police Tactical Commander and **meet as soon as possible if the Strategic Coordinating Group meeting is delayed for any reason**. Following this meeting the Police Tactical Commander will call meetings of the TCG as and when necessary to enact strategic decisions and report issues/advice back to the SCG.

The role of the TCG is to implement the strategic decisions made by the SCG and is the principal forum where all agencies meet to assess information, implement measures and support activity at an operational level. Membership of the TCG should include:

Police Scotland, Tactical Commander, Police Scotland

- Chair of TCG

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, Senior Officer

Scottish Ambulance Service, Senior Officer

Assistant MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA) – HM Naval Base Clyde

The Highland Council, Senior Community Development Manager

NHS Highland, Chief Officer – Highland Health and Social Care Partnership

Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Representative

Scottish Water, Representative

Food Standards Scotland, Representative

Scottish Government, Civil Contingencies Liaison Officer (SGCCLO)

Other Members:

- Representative of the STAC
- Representative of the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

IN ADDITION

The following officials **may** be required to support their Tactical representative:

- Police Scotland, Emergencies Procedure Adviser;
- The Highland Council, Emergency Planning Officer
- NHS Highland, Resilience Team Member

Chair of the meeting **may** invite other agencies to attend the TCG if input required.

TCG must be timed to support member's attendance at SCG, STAC and RCG meetings.

5.3.1.3 RECOVERY COORDINATING GROUP (RCG)

It is accepted that recovery management is best started as soon as possible. Accordingly, the first meeting of the SCG (following activation) will confirm that appropriate agencies have activated their incident management arrangements and are developing a recovery strategy. A Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) will subsequently be established to consider recovery issues which require addressing from the outset of the emergency. Membership of the RCG may include all/some of the following:

The Highland Council, Duty Chief Officer

- Chairs the RCG and ensures a deputy is identified.

The Highland Council, Senior Community Development Manager

The Highland Council, Senior Environmental Health Officer

NHS Highland, Head of Service – Highland Health & Social Care Partnership

NHS Highland, Consultant in Public Health Medicine

Ministry of Defence, Regional Liaison Officer (RLO)

Scottish Government, Civil Contingencies Liaison Officer

Police Scotland, Representative

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, Representative

Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Representative

Scottish Water, Representative

Food Standards Scotland, Representative

Animal and Plant Health Agency, Representative

Chair of the meeting **may** invite other agencies to attend the RCG meeting if input required.

RCG meetings must be timed to support members' input/attendance at the SCG, TCG or STAC. RCG meetings may be facilitated at the SCC or at another location nearby, or virtually.

5.3.1.4 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVICE CELL (STAC)

During a radiation emergency, the Police Strategic Commander and the SCG require clear, authoritative advice on public health impacts and appropriate off-site protective actions.

The STAC maintains a core membership to ensure consistency and rapid activation. Additional experts may be added depending on the incident's nature, scale, and complexity, as agreed with the SCG Chair.

An initial STAC meeting should be convened as soon as possible to assess early health and environmental risks and determine the specialist advice required. Where necessary, initial discussions and advice may be delivered by phone; reliable contact arrangements must therefore be in place. Membership of the STAC should include:

STAC Chair

- The STAC will normally be chaired by a senior NHS Highland representative, usually the Director of Public Health Medicine (or nominated representative).

- The chair should remain consistent wherever possible, as changes reduce STAC effectiveness.
- Chair handover to another agency should only occur once there are no public health issues requiring STAC consideration.
- The chair must be sufficiently senior and experienced to lead complex technical meetings and coordinate multi-agency advice.
- STAC chairs should have role-specific training (or equivalent) to support effective delivery.

Deputy Chair

- A Deputy Chair should be appointed to maintain continuity when the Chair is briefing or attending the SCG.

Core members of the STAC:

- NHS Highland, Director of Public Health (or nominated deputy).
- Office for Nuclear Regulation,
- The Highland Council, Senior Environmental Health Officer
- Police Scotland – as lead responder
- Scottish Fire & Rescue Service, HAZMAT Officer / Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA)
- UKHSA, RCE – Strategic Advisor
- Food Standards Scotland (FSS) with the support of Food Standards Agency
- SEPA Representative

Additional members may include:

- DSTL Health Physicist (covered by NEBUST HPA until arrival of DSTL)

- NHS Radiation Protection Adviser
- Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)
- Scottish Government
- Scottish Water
- Met Office

STAC meetings must be timed to support members' attendance at SCG, TCG and RCG meetings.

Public Information from the various agencies represented at the STAC will be provided to the Public Communication Cell by the Chair or via the SCG.

5.3.1.5 SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY GROUP FOR EMERGENCIES (SAGE)

It is anticipated that the SAGE will be activated in support of COBR for all nuclear emergencies where –

- 1) There has been an off-site release of radiological material
- 2) An off-site release is considered possible or
- 3) There is an incident that has serious implications for the site itself and those on it

SAGE will not sit at the SCC. It is anticipated that the STAC Chair would dial into SAGE meetings and vice versa.

During COBR activation, SAGE is responsible for co-ordinating and peer reviewing, as far as possible, scientific and technical advice to inform national-level decision-making. SAGE also supports Ministers in making evidence-based decisions on key national policy questions. During a nuclear scenario, it is anticipated that SAGE will focus on three primary subject areas –

1. Peer review of the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
2. Horizon scanning (e.g., understanding how the situation may evolve)
3. On-site technical diagnosis / prognosis

Peer review of scientific advice

SAGE provides expert oversight of the scientific advice informing emergency response decision-making through its peer review function. **SAGE will and must have a close, collaborative and supportive working relationship with the STAC, which will advise the SCG at the local strategic level on protective measures.**

In this role, SAGE peer reviews and adds value to local scientific advice (and the information/assessments it is based upon), providing subsequent reassurance to COBR (and STAC itself) that this advice is appropriately shaping decisions. Despite the close working and information sharing between SAGE and STACs, STACs remain accountable to SCGs and does not in any circumstance become a sub-committee of SAGE but remains focused on the advice requirements at the local level.

Horizon scanning function

SAGE's horizon scanning function contributes to government's responsibility to determine the likely development of the emergency, by using joint agency modelling and assessment (JAM) based on available scientific and technical data.

JAM delivery partners provide SAGE with an evolving but consolidated projection of how the event will develop. This allows government to ensure

an effective response across a range of credible scenarios by preparing in advance for potential future events.

Site Technical Diagnosis/Prognosis

This function requires SAGE to examine the events occurring at the nuclear site (or, if the event is transportation, the incident site) from a technical perspective, to understand the developing scenario and what is being done to bring the incident under control. Again, this will focus on understanding how events could unfold in the future. This will require close interaction and co-operation with the site operator (or carrier), STAC and nuclear regulator.

Communication between SAGE and STAC is essential to ensure a co-ordinated approach. The chairs of both SAGE and STAC should be in regular contact. The STAC chair will dial into SAGE and vice versa. The chair of SAGE will also dial directly into SGoRR meetings.

5.3.1.6 PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (PCG)

The overall responsibility for the co-ordination of provision of information to the public and response to the media lies with the police during the emergency phase. The police however must take account of the statutory responsibility placed on the local authority under the REPIR to provide information on emergency protective actions to the public affected in the event of a radiological accident.

It is vital therefore that there is close liaison between all organisations represented at the SCC on information management. The Media and Public Communications Group has two principal roles. **Firstly**, to implement the information dissemination requirements of the SCG, then **secondly**, to collate information and media briefing objectives for all main agencies, into an agreed strategy for the Police Media and Public Communications Manager.

In fulfilling these it must ensure not only that the local press briefings and conferences are coherent but also that information in briefings held by organisations out with the SCC, e.g., Scottish Ministers in Edinburgh and MOD Ministers in Whitehall does not conflict with information being given at the SCC.

All Public Communication messages prepared, must without exception be agreed by Strategic Coordinating Group before releasing, excluding initial information statements as per Appendix 2. These have been pre-agreed and should not be delayed in their release through SG approval.

Membership of the PCG should encompass main agencies responsible for information to the Public. It is essential that the following attend:

Police Scotland, Public Communications Manager

- Chairs the PCG.

The Highland Council, Corporate Communications Manager

- Fulfils Council statutory information objectives (PCG Chair in the recovery phase).

Ministry of Defence (MOD), Senior Public Relations Officer

- Fulfils MOD information requirements.

Scottish Government, Media Representative

- Fulfils Scottish Government objectives and links with Scottish Government Departments/Ministers.

****Other agencies may be invited to attend the media cell for specific information.****

5.3.1.7 RECOVERY STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (RSCG)

The role of the RSCG is to act as the decision-making body for the recovery phase, once hand-over has taken place between Police Scotland and The Highland Council. The purpose of the group is to give the broad overview and represent each agency's interests and statutory responsibilities.

The RSCG will establish and take advice from the working group sub-structure outlined in the *HILRP Response and Recovery Arrangements*, decide the recovery strategy, and ensure the implementation of that strategy and the rebuilding of public confidence.

Please refer to the *HILRP Response and Recovery Arrangements* for further information if required. Membership of the RSCG should include:

The Highland Council, Chief Executive (or Nominated Representative)

- Attends as Chair of the RSCG, accompanied by note taker.
- The Chair maintains records of minutes of all RSCG meetings and coordinates a master record of all working group meetings.

Chairs of the RSCG Working Groups

- As outlined in the *HILRP Response and Recovery Arrangements*

Other Members:

- Relevant Highland Council staff
- Relevant NHS Highland staff
- Relevant Police Scotland staff
- Relevant Ministry of Defence (MOD) staff
- Relevant Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) staff
- Representative of Public Health Scotland
- Representative of Scottish Government Rural Payments & Inspections Directorate (SGRPID)
- Scottish Government Civil Contingencies Liaison Officer
- Representative of the Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA)
- Representative of Food Standards Scotland (FSS)
- Representative of the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS)
- Representative of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS)
- Representative of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency
- Representative from NatureScot

5.3.1.7.1 EVACUATION

If an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency alert is received, an early evacuation of Aultbea will be considered by Police Scotland and The Highland Council. The decision to evacuate will be made at the strategic level of command at the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre, however evacuation is not considered to be a justifiable urgent protective action within the DEPZ. Evacuation procedures would only be commenced following confirmation from the MOD Collocated Team at Aultbea that there is no possibility of an imminent radioactive/chemical release. Evacuation protects the general public from fission products on the ground.

Evacuation is a Police responsibility and the decision to proceed with this sits with the strategic Commander, based on advice received from the MOD Co-ordinating Authority. If the MOD Co-ordinating Authority is not present in the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre, then advice will be sought from the MOD Collocated Team. Other public protection measures such as sheltering and SITs will be considered alongside evacuation.

5.4 MULTI-AGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

5.4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The Commanding Officer of a nuclear vessel is responsible for reactor safety at all times and, in the unlikely event of a reactor emergency, will assume the role of Incident Commander (IC). This responsibility remains until the designated Ashore Incident Commander is established, supported by the MOD Collocated Team and the Nuclear Emergency Back-up Support Team (NEBUST).

The MOD Collocated Team supports the IC on site and consists of specialist personnel including Health Physicists, a Royal Navy Fleet Technical Adviser, a Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team, and MOD Police, as detailed in the MOD SSOEP. Its role is to implement the SSOEP for the berth, support and advise civilian authorities at the site, and ensure reports are forwarded to the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre and Tactical Centre (Inverness), HMNB Clyde, and the MOD Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation Headquarters (HQ DNEO). The team is supplemented by the Ship's Company, which provides support to the EZRC and administrative support to the Collocated Team.

MOD collocated staff work jointly with, and provide specialist support to, local authorities and emergency services at the local level, Tactical Control, and the Strategic Control Centre (SCC).

The Ministry of Defence (Royal Navy) maintains a Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Organisation, part of which is the Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (North) [NEMT(N)], comprising monitoring units from HM Naval Base Clyde. During a NPW visit to the OPA jetty, NEMT(N) deploys as part of the Collocated Team for the duration of the visit, providing a 24-hour Emergency

Monitoring Unit. This capability enables assessment of the extent and hazard arising from any abnormal release of radioactivity following a nuclear reactor incident.

If a nuclear reactor emergency occurs at a berth where no full-scale Naval Command exists, MOD policy requires a Senior Naval Officer, supported by specialist staff, to deploy as quickly as possible to the designated Strategic Co-ordination Centre to assume the role of MOD Co-ordinating Authority (MCA). This deployment, known as the Nuclear Emergency Back-up Support Team (NEBUST), assists in controlling the emergency and advises civil authorities on radiological hazards affecting the public. NEBUST is headed by the MCA and includes specialists such as a Health Physicist, Royal Navy Fleet Technical Adviser, and Public Relations Officer, as detailed in the *MOD Operators On-Site Emergency Plan*.

5.4.1.1 ROLE OF A REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICER (RLO)

The Scotland RLO network provides a key liaison between the military and Civil Authorities, as required under the CCA 2004. In Scotland, the network comprises one Royal Navy RLO, two Joint RLOs (Army Officers), and one RAF RLO. Collectively, they support the Commander Joint Military Commander (Scotland)—an Army appointment—who reports to a national (UK) commander and headquarters, and ultimately to the MOD.

While other MOD elements have defined responsibilities within this plan, RLOs provide an additional layer of liaison and connectivity where this adds value. For the purposes of this plan, the Royal Navy RLO is the primary point of contact, with the RAF RLO as secondary. In particular, the RLO will

- brief into the Defence command chain as required without duplicating reporting

- support the response and recovery efforts as appropriate
- ensure effective liaison between MoD and Civil Authorities.

5.4.2 POLICE SCOTLAND

Responding to emergencies is a core function of the police service, with primary responsibilities for protecting life and property. During the emergency phase of any major incident, Police Scotland is responsible for the overall control and co-ordination of the emergency services and supporting agencies.

In response to an incident at an Operational Berth, Police Scotland and partner agencies share the following common objectives:

- protect life, property, and the environment;
- minimise the harmful effects of the emergency;
- support a swift return to normality;
- maintain normal services at an appropriate level;
- promote mutual support and co-operation between responders;
- support community recovery; and
- deliver an effective, co-ordinated joint response.

In addition, Police Scotland has specific responsibilities, including:

- co-ordinating the activities of local responders and supporting organisations at the scene, except where HM Coastguard leads maritime search and rescue;
- treating the affected area as a crime scene in parallel with the emergency response, unless the incident is clearly caused by natural events;

- acting under the direction of the Procurator Fiscal, as appropriate, and facilitating investigations by bodies such as the Health and Safety Executive, the Department for Transport Accident Investigation Branches (rail, air, and marine), and the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner (PIRC); and
- managing casualty information on behalf of the Procurator Fiscal, including identification of the deceased and removal of the dead.

5.4.3 THE HIGHLAND COUNCIL

In responding to an emergency, the principal responsibilities of The Highland Council are to:

- Provide assistance to the emergency services;
- Ensure the continuity and restoration of Council services;
- Provide professional and technical advice, personnel, transport, equipment, use of premises and any other material or resources which might be required during an emergency;
- Co-ordinate the situation when the emergency services have completed their phase of the emergency response;
- Comply with the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and its accompanying Regulations.

5.4.4 SCOTTISH FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE

Responding to emergencies is a core function of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS), based on its extensive experience in firefighting and rescue and its duty to save life and protect property.

In response to an incident involving a nuclear-powered submarine at an Operational Berth, SFRS responsibilities include:

- liaising with co-located MOD personnel to develop strategies to prevent escalation, including firefighting, managing released chemicals, and addressing other hazards;
- rescuing trapped casualties;
- liaising with medical services to support ambulance loading points and prioritise evacuation of casualties;
- participating in investigations as required, including the preparation of reports and evidence; and
- standing by during the non-emergency recovery phase, where necessary, to ensure ongoing site safety.
- In responding to an incident involving a nuclear-powered submarine berthed at an Operational Berth, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service's responsibilities may be summarised as follows:
 - Liaison with co-located MOD personnel to develop a strategy to prevent the further escalation of the incident by tackling fires, dealing with released chemicals and other hazardous situations
 - The rescue of trapped casualties
 - Liaison with the Medical Incident Officer and other medical services with regard to the provision of assistance at ambulance loading points and the priority evacuation of injured persons

- Participation in investigations as appropriate and preparing reports and evidence for inquiries
- Stand-by if necessary, during the non-emergency recovery phase to ensure continued safety at and around the site

5.4.5 SCOTTISH AMBULANCE SERVICE

The roles and responsibilities of the Service at a Major Incident do not differ to that of any other incident. They are:

- Save life and provide immediate care for patients at the scene of the incident and in transit to hospital.
- Alert Hospital Services and other relevant NHS agencies.
- Manage clinical decontamination for people affected by hazardous substances prior to their evacuation from the scene.
- Evacuate, where practicable, the injured from the scene in order of medical priority.
- Arrange and ensure the most appropriate transport for the injured to the receiving hospital(s).
- Supply patient care equipment to the scene of a Major Incident.
- Transport essential medical staff and their equipment to the scene.
- Alert the British Red Cross, St Andrew's Ambulance Association, and other approved voluntary organisations, and coordinate their work in support of the Service.
- Provide and maintain communications equipment for key medical staff and voluntary organisations at the scene.
- Restore the Service to normality including the requirement to maintain the continuity of core functions.

5.4.6 NHS HIGHLAND

NHS Highland (NHS H) is a Territorial Health Board and is responsible for the protection and the improvement of their population's health and for the delivery of frontline healthcare services. NHS H is also part of the Highland Health and Social Care Partnership whose services include

- Integrated Health and Social Care for Adults
- Primary Care
- Community Hospitals

In responding to an incident at an Operational Berth NHS H will:

- Respond to callouts from Police Scotland (Incident Response) and SAS (Mass Casualties)
- Care for decontaminated acute casualties brought to them for treatment by SAS
- Provide Hospital Based Decontamination facilities should contaminated people self-present to Emergency Departments
- Nominate for multi-agency meetings during the response and recovery phases
- Provide updates for the Scottish Government Health EPRR Team
- Chair and support the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and provide it with Public Health and Radiological Protection advice
- Convene a Care for People Group and support the delivery of Psychological First Aid
- Provide Occupational Health Support to NHS H responders
- Provide appropriate resources within a Radiation Monitoring Unit if one is established

- Work with the Public Communications Group to Warn and Inform local communities and the wider population
- Take part in post incident debrief activities to identify and embed learning

5.4.7 MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY (HM COASTGUARD)

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is an Executive Agency of the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is responsible for:

- Minimising loss of life amongst seafarers and coastal users.
- Responding to maritime emergencies 24 hours a day.
- Developing, promoting and enforcing high standards of marine safety.

Minimising the risk of pollution of the marine environment from ships and, where pollution occurs, minimising the impact on UK interests.

5.4.8 SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY (SEPA)

SEPA is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR). Under EASR, SEPA is responsible for authorising the management of radioactive waste on and from the site and maintains an independent monitoring regime for radioactivity in food and the environment around the site. SEPA also has access to the Radiological Response Emergency System (RREMS) in Scotland.

During an emergency SEPA may make environmental measurements in support of its function and may contribute any environmental measurement

capability to other organisations involved. SEPA will, if requested, provide advice to government on sampling and measurement of radioactive contamination in the environment, potable and surface waters, and the food chain. SEPA will advise on and authorise the management of any radioactive wastes arising as a result of an incident.

5.4.9 SCOTTISH WATER

In responding to an incident at Loch Ewe, Scottish Water responsibilities may be summarised as follows:

With respect to the public water supply Scottish Water shall:

- Ensure that risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors working on the public water supply are adequately controlled
- Asses the risk to public health of any of contamination to the public water supply (including raw water sources)
- Any Emergency response monitoring arrangements required will be agreed with the STAC. Any impact on statutory sampling of public and private water supplies will be agreed with the Drinking Water Quality Regulator (DWQR) for Scotland.
- Arrange and co-ordinate the sampling and analysis of public water supplies in conjunction with SEPA and other stakeholders
- Collate information on the level and nature of any contamination of public water supplies including raw water sources
- Asses the risk to public health from contaminated water supplies in conjunction with the relevant NHS Board(s) and Health Protection Scotland (HPS) as a result of any contamination

- Ensure that the DWQR and other relevant stakeholders including the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Unit (CIRU) and Water Industry Division within Scottish Government, are kept informed / consulted as required of any impacts identified and direction or guidance issued by the STAC or DWQR.
- Take any measures to minimise the risk to public health from contaminated water supplies
- Provide advice to Customers and Licence providers on public water supplies in accordance with the Public Health Guidance issued
- In coordination and agreement with SEPA, HPS and other stakeholders take the required measures to minimise risks to the public water infrastructure, staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any contamination of the public water supply or infrastructure
- Where there is a disruption to the public water supply, Scottish Water will, where practicable and with the support of Police Scotland and other relevant stakeholders arrange for the provision of alternative supplies of drinking water to impacted customers
- In consultation and agreement with SEPA, HPS and other stakeholders take the required measures to decontaminate and recover contaminated public water infrastructure and dispose of contaminated waters
- With respect to the public wastewater (sewerage) system Scottish Water shall:
 - Ensure that risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors working on the wastewater system are adequately controlled.
 - Assess the risk of contamination to the wastewater system

- Collate information on the level and nature of any contamination of the wastewater system
- Assess the risks to staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any contamination of the wastewater system
- Ensure that relevant stakeholders including the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Unit (CIRU) and Water Industry Division within Scottish Government, are kept informed / consulted as required of any impacts identified and direction or guidance issued by the STAC
- In co-ordination and agreement with SEPA, HPS and other stakeholders take the required measures to minimise risks to the wastewater infrastructure, staff, contractors, the public and other parties including the environment of any contamination of the wastewater system
- Arrange and co-ordinate sampling and analysis of process, point discharges, sludge and other relevant environmental samples in conjunction with SEPA, HPS and other stakeholders
- In consultation and agreement with SEPA, HPS and other stakeholders take the required measures to decontaminate and recover contaminated wastewater infrastructure and dispose of contaminated wastewater

5.4.10 FOOD STANDARDS SCOTLAND

Food Standards Scotland (FSS), which was established on 1 April 2015, is responsible for food safety in Scotland. FSS's role is to help protect the public from risks to health in relation to food and feed. The Food Standards Agency (FSA) is responsible for food safety in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Radiological food incidents are UK-wide by default and will normally be led by the Food Standards Agency (FSA). Where appropriate in Scotland, and by mutual agreement, Food Standards Scotland (FSS) may lead the food and feed safety response in Scotland, with FSA continuing to provide technical support, modelling and risk assessment advice.

In the event of a radiological emergency affecting Scotland, FSS will lead the Scottish Government's response on food and feed safety matters, assess the impact on the food chain, and implement proportionate protective and precautionary measures based on FSA technical advice.

Specific responsibilities are: -

- To liaise with relevant partners, as necessary, to develop and implement statutory restriction measures under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA), to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from affected areas
- To take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food and feed chain
- To provide support, advice, information and guidance to local authorities, businesses and the public on the implications for food and feed.

- To provide support and advice to the Scottish Government & partners dealing with the emergency.
- Liaise with local authorities to take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food chain. To ensure that subsequent recovery arrangements take account of food and food safety issues.
- Attend the Strategic Coordinating Centre (SCC), as appropriate.
- Attend and contribute to the Science and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC), with FSA providing scientific and technical advice.
- Provide advice on precautionary food and feed restriction areas where Maximum Permitted Levels may be exceeded, as determined by Food Standards Scotland in liaison with the Food Standards Agency. The areas affected by this precautionary advice can often be much larger than those areas where immediate protective actions, such as sheltering, have been implemented.
- Liaise with the Media Briefing Cell and contribute to coordinated public advice and communications for businesses, stakeholders and the public regarding food and feed safety implications.
- Attend the Public Communication Group as required

5.4.11 ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH AGENCY (APHA)

APHA acts as the Regulator for animal welfare monitoring, on behalf of Scottish Government. They also provide support for FSS in helping to enforce restrictions on the control of the production and supply of contaminated or potentially contaminated food stuffs.

APHA will also advise on the disposal of animal by-products. This could be potentially a significant issue in the aftermath of any off-site incident and will be done in conjunction with other bodies such as SEPA.

5.4.12 UK HEALTH SECURITY AGENCY (UKHSA)

In the event of a Nuclear emergency, UKHSA-RCCE's role and responsibilities are summarised as follows:

- Advise the STAC, RWG, TCG and SCG on radiological protection issues and protective actions to protect the public in both the emergency and recovery phases.
- Assess the radiological impact of the incident to the public.
- Provide support to NHS Highland in activities to monitor members of the public for radioactive contamination and radiation exposure.
- Support SEPA in its environmental monitoring role.
- Through UKHSA-RCCE's Monitoring Co-ordination Team at its Chilton Emergency Operations Centre co-ordinate off-site monitoring beyond the site's responsibilities using monitoring resources that are made available to it by other organisations.
- Provide public information on radiation, its effects and the radiological impact of the incident within the context of this plan and in co-operation with the SCC and MBC and within frameworks set out in Dealing with Disasters Together and the National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance.

5.4.13 OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION (ONR)

The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the statutory regulator for REPPiR 2019 and CGD Class 7, and a Category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA).

During a radiation emergency, ONR gathers information on operator actions and outcomes and provides independent specialist advice to the off-site emergency response, UK and devolved government departments, and other responding agencies.

Activation: ONR may be notified of site incidents and declarations by the operator in line with licence or authorisation conditions and, consistent with its Category 2 responder role, expects inclusion in off-site activation notifications. ONR maintains a 24/7 emergency contact point for radiation emergencies and major incidents (0151 922 5911).

Response: On notification of an off-site nuclear emergency, ONR will typically activate its response centre, the Redgrave Court Incident Suite (RCIS) in Liverpool. RCIS gathers and evaluates information and provides independent advice via deployed away teams (including those at the SCC) and, where appropriate, through liaison with the operator.

ONR role at the Strategic Coordinating Centre (SCC):

- support and advise organisations involved in the emergency response;
- attend Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) meetings;
- attend Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) meetings;
- maintain information exchange with RCIS.

ONR personnel at the SCC are likely to include:

- **SCC Lead Inspector:** co-ordinates ONR activity at the SCC and provides advice to the SCG;
- **SCC Specialist Inspector:** provides specialist technical support and deputises for the Lead Inspector;
- **SCC Radiological Protection Inspector:** attends and advises the STAC;
- **SCC Support:** provides administrative support and communications with RCIS.

Transition to Recovery: As an independent source of specialist advice, ONR expects to be involved in discussions on terminating the emergency phase and transitioning to recovery.

5.4.14 SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT

The MOD acts as the UK Lead Government Department; however, the Scottish Government plays a key role in supporting responses at Scottish nuclear sites, with off-site consequence management planning, response and recovery devolved to it. Devolved activity is co-ordinated by the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR).

The role of SGoRR will vary depending on the emergency but, in broad terms, it will:

- brief Scottish Ministers;
- act as the focal point for communication between the Scottish Government and responder agencies;
- co-ordinate and support Scottish Government Directorates;
- consider the need to request emergency regulations;
- collate and maintain a strategic overview of the response, with a focus on consequence management;
- ensure effective communication between local, Scottish and UK levels, including co-ordinated response and recovery reporting;
- support response and recovery activities as appropriate; and
- ensure effective liaison with UK Government Departments, including the MOD and COBR.

The MOD and Scottish Government will work closely throughout the response.

Note: *In the event of a terrorist attack on a nuclear asset/site, the Home Office will be appointed LGD during the Counter-Terrorism phase*

5.4.15 DEPARTMENT FOR ENERGY SECURITY AND NET ZERO (DESNZ)

DESNZ provides strategic policy advice, supports national-level coordination where required, and manages international liaison. It is not the Lead Government Department for defence nuclear emergencies, including incidents involving nuclear-powered vessels at Loch Ewe; in such cases, the MOD retains LGD responsibility. Where engaged, DESNZ may:

- provide strategic advice to UK Ministers on policy implications;
- support cross-government situational awareness;
- manage international notification and liaison (e.g. with the IAEA, European Commission and bilateral partners), where required;
- support coordination of national-level assets if requested; and
- liaise with the Scottish Government, recognising its responsibility for off-site consequence management in Scotland.

6 SECTION SIX: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.1 EMERGENCY WORKERS IN THE DEPZ

Access to the DEPZ is restricted to designated emergency workers only, as required to support the management of a radiation emergency and the implementation of protective actions.

Emergency workers who may be authorised to enter the DEPZ include:

- Ships' Company
- Members of civil emergency authorities, including Police Scotland, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and the Scottish Ambulance Service
- Naval and civil Radiation Monitoring Teams
- Other essential workers, as necessary and appropriately authorised.

All emergency workers must receive a radiation safety briefing from their employer prior to entry to the DEPZ, or as soon as practicable following the declaration of an emergency where personnel are required to remain within the area. Briefings will be task-specific and proportionate to the hazards present.

Police Scotland will not normally enter the DEPZ unless required to support the implementation of public protective actions, maintain security, preserve evidence, or undertake investigative functions. Where entry is required, appropriate radiological protection and safety procedures will be followed. The radiological safety requirements for all responding personnel will be determined and implemented through the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC), informed by specialist advice.

The response within the DEPZ will be dependent on the prevailing radiation and contamination hazards. Where decontamination of injured personnel is

required beyond the capability of the Exclusion Zone Reception Centre, the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS) will assume responsibility for triage and decontamination.

The principal responsibilities when responding to a radiation emergency include:

- saving life and providing immediate care at the scene and during transport to hospital
- alerting hospital services, immediate care GPs and relevant NHS agencies
- evacuating injured personnel in order of medical priority
- arranging and ensuring appropriate transport to receiving hospitals
- supplying patient care equipment to the scene of a major incident
- transporting appropriate medical staff and specialist equipment as required

6.1.1 PROTECTION OF RESPONDING AGENCIES

Arrangements are in place to ensure the protection of all responding agencies in compliance with REPIR Regulations 18 and 20.

- **Police Scotland:** No member of staff will receive a radiation **dose exceeding 1 mSv**. All deployments will be subject to specific Strategic, Tactical and Operational controls.
- **Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS):** Dose limits are determined by UK FRS Generic Risk Assessment 5.5. Firefighters may receive up to 20 mSv during a radiation incident, with emergency exposure **up to 100 mSv** permitted for the purpose of saving life, authorised by the SFRS Strategic Commander following consultation with the SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser.
- **Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS):**
 - Reference Level 1: up to 1 mSv
 - Reference Level 2: up to 5 mSv per event
 - Reference Level 3: up to 100 mSv for informed volunteers (including SORT staff) undertaking entrapment or prolonged life-saving interventions

The protection of staff from all responding agencies will be overseen by their respective Radiological Protection Advisers, with controls applied proportionately to the assessed risks.

6.2 RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY REFERENCE LEVELS OF DOSE

The MOD requires that Site Specific Intervention Levels are calculated and used for each relevant site. The Site-Specific Intervention levels, for Scottish MOD Berths, are based on the lower UKHSA-RCCE Emergency Reference Level, which are detailed below.

The implementation of emergency protective actions will be in accordance with the arrangements detailed in the following table.

PROTECTIVE ACTION	EFFECTIVE DOSE OR ORGAN DOSE	AVERTED DOSE (MSV) ^A	
		LOWER	UPPER
SHELTERING	EFFECTIVE	3	30
EVACUATION	EFFECTIVE	30	300
STABLE IODINE	THYROID ^B	30	100
^AIN RECOGNITION OF THEIR HIGHER CANCER RISK, THE DOSES ARE THOSE POTENTIALLY AVERTED IN YOUNG CHILDREN ^BMSV EQUIVALENT DOSE TO THE THYROID SOURCE PHE CRCE 049			

6.3 PUBLIC PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

In the highly unlikely event of an OSNE, radiation levels above natural background may occur and persist for a period. Depending on the severity of the incident, it may be necessary to implement emergency protective actions within the surrounding area to reduce radiation doses to individuals.

The implementation of widespread protective actions is not risk-free. Decisions to introduce or withdraw such measures will therefore be based on the principle that protective actions must:

- Achieve more benefit than harm, and

- Be optimised to provide the greatest overall protection to those affected.

The primary criteria for implementing emergency protective actions are:

- a) No individual should suffer acute health effects from radiation exposure.
- b) The increased health risk from radiation exposure if no action were taken should be balanced against the potential detriment caused by the protective action itself.
- c) Within the UK, guidance on emergency protective actions is provided by the United Kingdom Health Security Agency – Radiation, Chemical, Climate and Environmental Hazards Directorate (UKHSA-RCCE).

Basic protective principles of time, distance and shielding underpin all decisions and are applied through three population-level protective actions.

In the event of an OSNE, members of the public within the potentially affected area will be warned immediately via an emergency alert.

Initial warning messages will be also issued by Police Scotland through all available media channels, with further advice and updates provided as the situation develops.

The principal emergency protective actions that may be implemented during the early phase of an OSNE are:

a) Sheltering

- Remaining indoors with doors and windows closed.
- Switching off ventilation or air-conditioning systems that draw air from outside.

b) Stable Iodine Administration

- If taken prior to, or within a few hours of inhalation of radioactive iodine, stable iodine substantially reduces uptake by the thyroid gland and therefore reduces radiation dose.
- Stable Iodine Tablets (SITs) have been pre-distributed to households within the DEPZ.
- Additional stocks are held by the MOD at the Oil Fuel Depot.

c) Evacuation

- Evacuation provides protection primarily against radiation exposure from fission products deposited on the ground.
- It would only be initiated following careful consideration of the prevailing hazards and specialist advice, recognising that evacuation carries greater inherent risk than sheltering.

UKHSA-RCE advises that, where justified, emergency protective actions should be implemented promptly. Other actions, such as decontamination of buildings or land, are less time-critical and will be considered based on the specific circumstances of the incident.

Detailed arrangements for warning and informing the public within the DEPZ are contained in Section 7, with pre-prepared initial information statements set out in Section 10.2.

6.3.1 EXTENDING THE AREA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

The SCG will continually assess the requirements for all protective actions. This may require consideration of an extension of the area to ensure maximum protection and reassurance.

6.3.2 BASIS FOR LIFTING PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

Protective actions will not be lifted until the SCG, advised by specialist agencies such as UKHSA-RCCE, is convinced that the risk to the public is less than if the protective actions were to remain in force.

6.3.3 EVACUATION/RELOCATION

It is unlikely that the immediate evacuation/relocation of members of the civilian population will become necessary. However, should the civil authorities, acting on advice from the multi- agency STAC at the SCC consider it desirable; the police will put evacuation procedures into operation.

It is anticipated that in such extreme circumstances the period of evacuation might be prolonged, therefore, the local authority will make arrangements for Emergency Support Centres to be opened. School children evacuated during school hours will be cared for by the local authority until released into the care of a parent/guardian.

It may also be necessary in the interests of public safety to restrict access to contaminated areas. All necessary actions will be co-ordinated by Police Scotland, MOD and the Local Authority.

It has been recognised that, in the event of a radiation emergency, some members of the public will self-evacuate immediately, ignoring the official advice to shelter. If possible, those people will be catered for in designated emergency support centres.

In the event of a declaration of evacuation, a small number of members of the public may act erratically. Given the heightened emotional significance of evacuation and the public zeitgeist around nuclear energy, there is a small potential for these people to act in counterproductive or even dangerous ways.

There may be a need to evacuate the submarine crew temporarily to an Emergency Support Centre. NHS Highland and the Highland Council will work with the MOD in the identification and opening of a suitable premise.

6.3.4 RADIATION MONITORING

A HM Naval Base Clyde Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (NEMT) will carry out immediate pre-determined monitoring strategies using portable radiation monitoring equipment at Loch Ewe external to the site.

The NEMT will be supported by a significant number of additional specialist monitoring teams from the MOD, civil nuclear power authorities, government and scientific departments. These additional specialist monitoring teams will be co-ordinated by UKHSA - RCCE.

6.3.5 MEDICAL RESPONSE

The Scottish Ambulance Service provides the treatment to of casualties in the first instance. Co-ordinating the NHS response lies with NHS Highland who may need to set up the following facilities to deal with the health needs of the affected population:

a) Screening Clinics:

- For **occupationally exposed personnel** of the emergency services.

b) Screening Clinics

- For **members of the public and service personnel**, within the emergency site, and possibly the DEPZ.

c) Emergency Support Centres:

- The provision of medical and psycho-social support personnel at emergency support centres is co-ordinated by the NHS and The Highland Council.

6.3.6 COMMERCIAL SHIPPING AND PLEASURE CRAFT IN THE AREA

HM Coastguard will be advised of any hazard to shipping from information gathering at the SCC during response. They will be responsible for implementing restrictions which may be necessary.

6.4 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN

On declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE), the Oil Fuel Depot and MOD will implement initial road closures and traffic management arrangements. Responsibility will transfer to Police Scotland at the earliest opportunity and will be progressively transitioned to Highland Council staff as resources become available.

6.5 FOOD SAFETY ADVICE

Radiological food incidents are UK-wide by default and will normally be led by the Food Standards Agency (FSA). Where appropriate in Scotland, and by mutual agreement, Food Standards Scotland (FSS) may lead the food and feed safety response in Scotland, with FSA continuing to provide technical support, modelling and risk assessment advice. In the event of a radiological emergency affecting Scotland, FSS will lead the Scottish Government's response on food and feed safety matters, assess the impact on the food chain, and implement proportionate protective and precautionary measures based on FSA technical advice.

FSS will also:

- provide radiological modelling and technical advice which considers the long-term effects of ingesting radioactive contamination
- assess the impact on the food/feed chain and provide precautionary advice and any necessary protective measures to businesses and consumers

- liaise with FSA to input into the appropriate monitoring programme for assessment of the impact on human foodstuffs
- provide advice on food contamination issues to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) within the SCC and responder organisations
- liaise directly with the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)
- liaise with SGLD, SG Agriculture Food and Rural Communities (AFRC) Directorate and Local Authorities to develop the FEPA, which once in place, is enforced by Local Authority enforcement officers or Marine Scotland if the affected area is offshore out with the Local Authority's jurisdiction
- FSS may advise Scottish Ministers to issue statutory food restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA), to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area. This is to ensure that contaminated food, which may pose a risk to human health, does not enter the food chain.
- The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) will co-ordinate monitoring effort including both sampling and analysis for the assessment of the impact on the human food chain together with other monitoring programmes e.g., for the environment. FSA will co-ordinate the production of radiological food monitoring data/reports and provide to FSS, SEPA and UKHSA. FSA will provide up to date risk assessment advice to FSS who will work closely with SEPA, UKHSA, Local Authority Environmental Health/Trading

Standards teams, Scottish Government (SG) including the SG Legal Department (SGLD), SG Animal Health and Welfare Division (SG-AHWD), SG Rural Payments and Inspections Division (SG- RPID), Marine Scotland and others to ensure that food controls are put in place.

- SEPA will provide advice to ensure contaminated foodstuffs are disposed of appropriately in accordance with the best advice available e.g., *UK Recovery Handbooks for Radiation Incidents*. SEPA is responsible for developing advice for multi-agency responders regarding disposal routes and availability.

6.5.1 LIVESTOCK AND ANIMAL HEALTH

- In implementing food safety advice and controls, animal welfare issues must also be considered. For example, it may be possible to shelter animals and switch off ventilation to reduce exposure to contamination, but this may not be suitable for prolonged periods. Therefore, for animal welfare reasons it may be appropriate to allow some exposure to radioactivity even where this means the animals will no longer be suitable for food production. This may be a decision for STAC and the SCG within the SCC in conjunction with FSS, SG-AHWD and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA).
- SG-AHWD will provide advice and support activity to minimise the impact of the radiological contamination of livestock
- SG-AHWD's policy responsibilities include the health and welfare of livestock, working, companion and zoo animals.
- FSS, following liaison with FSA and SG-AHWD, will consider the need for advisory and statutory controls on livestock movements on the basis of food safety and AHWD will consider the need for

similar measures on the basis of welfare. If restrictions are required, FSS will share food risk assessments with SG-AHWD to inform animal welfare decisions.

- SG Agricultural & Rural Directorate (AR Directorate) will co-ordinate communication with farms on the movement of livestock.
- SG-AR Directorate will provide guidance to STAC / farmers on the milking of cattle.
- SG-RPID will be available to offer on the ground local agricultural knowledge to FSS as required.
- Local Authority Environmental Health / Trading Standards enforcement teams will provide information regarding locations of food businesses and farms in the vicinity, as required.
- APHA will undertake some of the practical work on SG's behalf, such as providing local veterinary advice where appropriate.
- The Strategic team and STAC within the SCC, in conjunction with FSS, SG, Local Authorities and APHA will take decisions on matters such as the need for evacuation of animals, the housing of evacuated animals, particularly companion animals, and movement restrictions.

6.5.2 MILK

- For milk consumption, FSA in liaison with FSS will undertake a risk assessment to decide if restrictions on the supply of milk are required.
- FSS will work with Local Authorities to enforce any restrictions as required and make arrangements for the monitoring and analysis of milk from affected farms.

- SEPA will provide advice to the STAC on the potential disposal of any affected milk. Local responders at STAC may need to agree the options for the disposal of milk and this may need to be escalated to SAGE if disposal cannot be managed locally.
- SG-AR Directorate will provide guidance to STAC / farmers on the milking of cattle.
- SG Rural Payments and Inspections Division maintains record of dairy farms in Scotland.
- **Further downwind precautions:**
 - The Food Standards Agency will carry out risk assessment to define the precise affected area. Food Standards Scotland will advise of necessary restrictions after consultation with the Naval Authorities, the representatives of the Scottish Government and the NHS Board.
 - The Local Authority will be informed of the area affected in order to enable it to give advice on behalf of Food Standards Scotland on matters affecting the consumption of foodstuffs produced in the area. The Local Authority is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date list of all dairy farms within 10km of the nuclear submarine berth in the Loch Ewe.

6.5.3 FISH/SHELLFISH

- FSA will carry out a risk assessment to determine if shellfish harvesting restrictions are required. FSS hold details of the various shellfish harvesting sites around Scotland. SEPA and Marine Directorate can provide advice and information on freshwater fisheries, aquaculture, seaweed/algae harvesting etc.

- FSS will liaise with Marine Directorate should sea fish be affected by the nuclear radiological emergency.
- FSS will liaise with Local Authorities, SEPA and Marine Directorate who hold details of approved fishery establishments.

6.6 WATER SUPPLIES

The Drinking Water Quality Regulator for Scotland is responsible for ensuring that water supplies are safe to drink, and will work with stakeholders such as Scottish Water, local authorities and health boards to co-ordinate work to preserve safe public and private drinking water supplies and provide consistent advice to consumers in accordance with the *UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents – Drinking Water Supplies*.

Scottish Water will issue advice to domestic customers, licence providers and where appropriate direct to business customers, on the public drinking water supply having agreed the key messages to be communicated with the relevant stakeholders including the local authorities and health boards in the areas affected.

Scottish water will, in conjunction with SEPA, Public Health Scotland, UKHSA-RCCE and other key stakeholders undertake a programme of sampling to monitor for impacts on the public water supply.

FSS, following liaison with FSA, will provide advice on bottled water products and use of water in food production.

6.6.1 PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIES

Though the potential for impacts on the public water supply are likely to be low, where required, to ensure public safety, and provide re-assurance to the public, sampling of the public water supply may be undertaken. This will be co-ordinated by Scottish Water with the support of relevant agencies including SEPA. A team from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) will also be available to assist in this task.

6.6.2 PRIVATE WATER SUPPLIES

Some properties that are not connected to the public water supply rely on private wells, natural springs, surface water, ground water, or rainwater harvesting sources. These sources may be at risk of contamination. For this reason, it may be necessary to consider placing restrictions on the consumption of water from private water supplies in the area. Highland Council Environmental Health maintains a register of private water supplies in the council area.

The Highland Council Environmental Health will carry out sampling to assess the water quality and shall, during an emergency incident, report these results to the DSTL team. Any restrictions on the consumption of PWSs will be agreed jointly by Environmental health and the Director of Public Health Medicine.

Where restrictions are introduced, alternative water arrangements shall be required. Scottish Water and The Highland Council will be responsible for the provision and ongoing review of these arrangements. Lifting of restrictions will be after agreement of the Director of Public Medicine.

7 SECTION SEVEN: PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

7.1 MEDIA RESPONSE

It is essential that all agencies develop a frank and open relationship with the media in order to lessen the likelihood of dissemination of inaccurate or misleading information that could lead to unnecessary public alarm. Police Scotland Corporate Communications is responsible for the co-ordination of information to the public and media during the emergency phase of the incident. Responsibility for co-ordinating public communications during the recovery phase will fall to the local authority.

The above will be carried out in accordance with the NoSRRP Public Communications Plan.

7.1.1 MEDIA BRIEFING CENTRE

All local media activities in the event of a radiological emergency are conducted from the Media Briefing Centre located near to the SCC or virtually. Information supplied to the media is co-ordinated by the Public Communications Group in the SCC and issued only after the agreement of the Strategic Coordinating Group.

7.1.2 PRESS STATEMENTS

All initial announcements (made before the establishment of the SCC) should be confined to brief factual details that are aimed at public safety information (See 10.2 Emergency Broadcast).

It is important to get this out as soon as possible after the Cascade call out, if necessary, before the SCC is operational. Therefore, the Emergency Broadcast is prepared and agreed in advance and appears in this off-site plan for easy access.

Once the SCC is operational, any press statements should be issued only through the Public Communications Group to ensure that no conflicting information is being passed to the media.

To ensure co-ordination and continuity of information, the communications officers from each agency should co-locate to the SCC.

A copy of the first agreed Press Release is printed in Appendix 10.2. This can also be used early on, before Tactical/Strategic groups meet.

7.1.3 PRESS CONFERENCE

Once the objectives and participants for the Press Conference have been agreed, a separate pre-meeting will be held of the participants. This will be chaired by Police Scotland Corporate Communications Strategic or Tactical lead and will run through the key points of each participant's statement thus ensuring the objectives are met. Other agencies communications team will be required to support with briefing their representatives.

7.1.4 MEDIA LIAISON OFFICERS

Police Media Liaison Officers may be appointed to co-ordinate media access to nominated vantage points near the site or at other locations.

7.2 WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC

7.2.1 WARNING THE PUBLIC

The local authority is responsible for providing, on a three-yearly basis, advice to residents who live within the 1.5km DEPZ on the actions they should take immediately they are made aware of a radiation emergency.

On notification of an OSNE by the MOD a pre-loaded Emergency Alert will be issued via the Cabinet Office Emergency Alert system to provide immediate public warning and precautionary advice. The alert directs affected communities to go indoors, secure their homes, and access trusted information sources, including local radio and official websites. A copy of the initial message can be found in section 10.2.

Any subsequent emergency alerts or updates will be coordinated and issued through the Public Communications Group (PCG) to ensure consistent, timely and multi-agency-approved public messaging.

7.2.2 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

The duty to provide information to the public is that of the local authority under The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPPPIR). This duty can only be carried out with the support and co-operation of all the agencies responding to the emergency.

Additionally, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires Category 1 responders to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency or if one is likely to occur.

However, in the emergency phase of the incident, the co-ordination of information to the public will fall to Police Scotland Media and Information

Services Corporate Communications in line with the NoSRRP Public Communication Plan and duties to lead co-ordination under the Civil Contingencies Act. Other Category 1 and partner agencies will be required to support public communications including local authority and Ministry of Defence.

The responsibility to co-ordinate public communications during the recovery phase will sit with the local authority.

Further information about the co-ordination of public communications is available in the North of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership Public Communications plan with support from the Communication Managers from MOD and Local Authority. In the recovery phase some key roles in the co-ordination arrangements will be transferred to the local authority.

Communications officers from all agencies should co-locate at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre as soon as possible. It is recognised that initial communications response may be carried out virtually and some aspects may remain virtual. However key members of the Public Communications Group should attend the SCC at the earliest opportunity to form the Public Communications Cell.

Information to the public will be disseminated through all the normal media channels owned channels such as websites and social media; media, and in addition, information points may be established if considered necessary and agreed by the Strategic group. These are where people might visit to ask questions relating to the incident. Questions might relate to:

- a) Up to date information on the emergency situation
- b) Safety of family and friends

- c) Safety of food and water supplies
- d) Compensation claims
- e) Housing and property enquiries

The most appropriate location for information points will be established at the time of the incident, but may be in local libraries, council offices or similar premises. The information made available to these information points will be provided by the Public Communications cell and resources to manage this will have to be identified in advance of set-up.

7.2.3 HELPLINE(S)

If any agency sets up its own telephone help line, they must maintain a close link with the Public Communications Group at the SCC to ensure clarity of information for callers. If a Helpline is to be set-up, this must be agreed by the Strategic group in order to ensure that the best use is made of the resource, for example, that information needs identified through questions asked are raised with the media and Public Communications Group, also to ensure that information is being disseminated through it.

7.2.4 WEBSITE INFORMATION

Information will also be made available by way of regular updates on The Highland Council, Police Scotland and MOD Websites.

8 SECTION EIGHT: STAND DOWN AND RECOVERY

8.1 TRANSITION TO RECOVERY

8.1.1 TRANSITION CRITERIA

Prescribing the criteria necessary for initiation of the transition of Strategic Co-ordination to the Local Authority.

Purpose

The response to any nuclear reactor emergency will involve two clear phases of response:

- a) **the emergency phase** during which the actions of the incident responders will be determined by the chain of events and the situations arising from the release of radionuclides, secondary threats (explosion, fire, etc) and the need to protect the public (shelter, food and water sources). This is led by the Chief Constable for Police Scotland.
- b) **The recovery phase** is the process of “returning to normality” after the emergency incident has ceased. This is led by the Chief Executive of The Highland Council.

These are not two distinct phases, and the transition will happen gradually during an emergency. The transition to the proactive phase of the response, the Recovery Phase, must itself be planned and prepared for.

This work will commence during the emergency phase where the Recovery Coordinating Group will be tasked with the remit of identifying the nature and extent of off-site contamination arising from the emergency as well as

strategies and options for the protection of the communities affected by the emergency and the return to “normality”. Please see Figure 1 below:

8.1.2 TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS FROM ‘EMERGENCY’ TO ‘RECOVERY’

The basis for any decision to handover to the local authority will relate to:

- I. The change in emphasis from reactive (responding) to proactive actions (planning),
- II. The effectiveness of the off-site coordination,
- III. The willingness of the Chief Constable to declare that the emergency phase is concluded; and
- IV. The preparedness of the local authority to accept the responsibility.

The following circumstances should prevail before the transition can be considered appropriate:

a) The reactor emergency is deemed to have ceased when:

- The reactor is stable
- Emissions to all phases of the environment have ceased
- There is no foreseeable risk of a further release of radionuclide material
- The vessel is secured against movement and is not exposed to external hazards e.g. fire, explosion

b) No significant issues remain unresolved when:

- The SCC & TCC is firmly established in a pro-active mode, and is no longer having to react to external events

- The management of outstanding matters is being progressed and managed effectively, the SCC & TCC having the necessary:
 - Resources
 - Communications and “action logging” systems
 - Established media co-ordination arrangements

c) Public safety measures are in place and working effectively

- There is restricted public movement.

d) There is consensus support for the handover when: -

- The MOD Co-ordinating Authority and Local Authority Chief Executive support the decision of the Police Incident Commander to handover to the Local Authority;
- The Scottish Government supports the handover.

e) The Council is prepared and ready to accept the handover, and to adopt the role of SCC Co-ordinator

- The proposal has been intimated at the preceding meeting of the SCC Strategic.

8.1.3 THE HANDOVER PROCESS

A formal handover will take place from the Police Strategic Incident Commander to the Local Authority Chief Executive. This signifies the formal transfer to the Recovery phase. At that time, the Chief Executive of The Highland Council will assume Chair of the LRP Strategic from the Senior Police Officer and will use the Standard meeting agenda (see Appendix 1).

9 SECTION NINE: ADMINISTRATION & GOVERNANCE

9.1 ADMINISTRATION OF THE PLAN

The Off-site Emergency Plan is to be formally reviewed at least every three years, and additionally following any significant incident, exercise, organisational change, or change in risk profile. Reviews must consider operational performance, lessons identified, regulatory updates, and changes to port activities or infrastructure to ensure the plan remains effective and compliant.

Following incidents or exercises, findings and recommendations are to be assessed and, where necessary, incorporated into the Plan without delay. Amendments must be clearly controlled and communicated to all holders of controlled copies.

Records of reviews, amendments, and distribution are to be retained to demonstrate compliance and support audit or regulatory inspection.

9.1.1 REVIEW AND AMENDMENT RECORD

Review Date	Comments	Next review
January 2005		December 2005
1 March 2012		March 2013
September 2015		January 2018
March 2018		
July 2018	V5.3	January 2021
August 2018	V5.4	January 2021
November 2020	REPPIR 2019	May 2021
July 2021	V6.1	December 2021
November 2023	V7.0	November 2026
November 2024	V7.1	November 2027
August 2026	V8.0	August 2029

9.1.2 DISTRIBUTION LIST

An electronic version of this plan is issued to the list below.

- HM Naval Base, Clyde
- Office for Nuclear Regulation
- Highland Council
- Police Scotland
- Scottish Fire and Rescue Service
- Scottish Ambulance Service
- HM Coastguard
- NHS Highland
- Scottish Government
- Animal and Plant Health Agency – APHA
- Food Standards Scotland – FSS
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency – SEPA
- United Kingdom Health Security Agency – Radiation, Chemical, Climate and Environmental Hazards Directorate (UKHSA – RCCE)
- Met Office
- Scottish Water

It is the responsibility of individual agencies to manage the distribution within their own organisations and to keep a record of the document holders for updates and re-distribution.

10 APPENDICES

10.1.1 DESIGNATED HOSPITALS

NHS Highland, in conjunction with the Scottish Ambulance Service will designate receiving hospitals to meet the specific demands of a radiation emergency, the most likely being Raigmore Hospital.

Casualties who are contaminated and with serious injuries or suspected of having received high radiation doses will normally be dealt with in accordance with NHS arrangements at the designated receiving hospitals, except in circumstances where life threatening injuries require immediate treatment or stabilisation. In these circumstances this will be carried out at the nearest suitable hospital.

10.2 APPENDIX 2: PRE-PREPARED EMERGENCY MESSAGING

10.2.1 PRE-LOADED EMERGENCY ALERT

The following pre-loaded emergency alert message has been approved for use via the Cabinet Office Emergency Alert system following notification from the Ministry of Defence. The message provides immediate precautionary advice and may be updated or supplemented through the Public Communications Group (PCG) as further information becomes available.

10.2.1.1 *PRE-DRAFTED EMERGENCY ALERT – INITIAL PUBLIC WARNING*

This is an emergency alert issued by The Highland Council.

A Nuclear Emergency has occurred at the Loch Ewe Operational Berth.

As a precaution go indoors, shut all windows and doors.

For further information and advice on protective actions tune into Greatest

Hits Radio – North Scotland (1107AM), visit

<https://www.highland.gov.uk/downloads/download/201/loch-ewe-offsite-emergency-plan> or check <https://www.gov.uk/alerts>.

10.2.2 POLICE SCOTLAND EMERGENCY BROADCAST

The following statement should only be released after consultation with the Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) or the Duty Assistant Chief Constable and the Senior Police Press Officer Chair of the Public Communications Group.

10.2.2.1 *Initial Statement 1*

On declaration of ONSE Police Scotland will release the following statement:

‘An incident occurred at (time, day and date) on board the Nuclear Submarine (HMS XX) which is currently berthed at the Oil Fuel Depot jetty at Loch Ewe. Emergency Services have been alerted and are currently responding. As a precaution we are advising members of the public within 1.5km of the site, including residents in (Aultbea / Mellon Charles as appropriate) to take shelter, the instructions for which are:

- *Go indoors and stay there*
- *Close all doors, windows and ventilators*
- *Switch off any ventilation or air conditioning systems which draw air from outside the building*
- *Do not try to collect children from school, the school authorities will look after them*
- *Food that has been stored inside or is in sealed packaging is safe to consume. Please wait for further advice with regard to food which has been exposed outside. Water from private water supplies should not be consumed until advised otherwise*
- *People in the Aultbea area who have been issued with Stable Iodine Tables (SITs) should locate these now but do not take them until further instructions are issued*
- *Roadblocks are being put in place on the A832 north and south of Aultbea to control access to the immediate area, people leaving the area will not be affected*

- *A telephone helpline, to provide advice and guidance for members of the public affected by this incident, is being set up by The Highland Council; the number to call will be broadcast as soon as possible.*

Keep tuned to one of the following: Radio Scotland (92.4 – 94.7 FM or 810 MW), Radio NAN GalDHEAL (103.5 – 105.00 FM), Two Lochs Radio (106 & 106.6 FM); or tune your television to STV or BBC Scotland; check Police Scotland Facebook and X pages. An update will be given when further information becomes available.

10.2.2.2 Supplementary Statement 2

Further press public communication statements will be developed as part of the press communications strategy within the media cell at the SCC by the Public Communications Group. Should the situation worsen, and Radiation Hazard is confirmed the following statement is to be considered for release (but must be approved by **XX**):

“Further to the media release [insert time], on the advice of the Director of Public Health members of the public within 1.5km of the Oil Fuel Depot jetty at Loch Ewe, who have previously been issued with Stable Iodine Tablets (SITs) should now take them in accordance with the written instructions. Members of the public previously advised to do so should continue to remain indoors.”

****Notes for Editors****

Police Scotland Media and Public Corporate Communications staff are on route to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre at Inverness where media facilities are being/have been established.

Media representatives, who should bear some form of professional/company accreditation, are asked to rendezvous there at [location].

Further information and advice regarding the incident will be given in due course, along with details of the telephone numbers.

10.3 APPENDIX 3: RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION DEFINITIONS

To understand the hazards of a reactor emergency, it is important to distinguish between **radiation** and **contamination**.

Even when fission products remain contained, the penetrating radiation they emit can still irradiate people nearby; **this is a radiation hazard**. Protection is achieved by reducing time near the source, increasing distance, or placing shielding between people and the radiation source.

If fission products contaminate personnel—either externally on the skin or internally through inhalation or ingestion—the radioactive material continues to irradiate the person until removed. **This is a contamination hazard**. Protective clothing can reduce contamination, and skin contamination can usually be removed by simple washing.

10.3.1 THE HAZARDS

Following an OSNE involving the release of fission products outside the primary circuit, people may be irradiated in two ways:

- a) **Hull Gamma Shine** – Gamma radiation from fission products retained within the submarine containment is transmitted through the vessel's hull. Distance and shielding reduce exposure, but people inside or close to the vessel may be exposed to high radiation levels. This is a pure radiation hazard.
- b) **Release to the environment** – Less likely is the release of fission products into the air or water. As radioactive material is involved, this presents both radiation and contamination hazards.

10.3.2 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION

The hazard from a reactor emergency arises from ionising radiation emitted by fission products. As radiation passes through the body it causes ionisation, which can damage or kill cells. While the human body is continually exposed to natural background radiation and has repair mechanisms, high doses may overwhelm these defences.

If sufficient cells are damaged or killed, **acute radiation** effects may occur, including skin burns and, at very high doses, death. These effects have defined dose thresholds below which they will not occur.

At doses below these thresholds, acute effects do not occur, but cell damage may increase the long-term statistical risk of cancer. For radiation protection purposes, this risk is assumed to increase in direct proportion to dose, with no threshold.

10.4 APPENDIX 4: OUTLINE PLANNING ZONE


Assessments of the consequences of radiation emergencies demonstrate that emergency protective actions would only be required beyond the DEPZ in the improbable event of a large release of fission products to the atmosphere.

The probability of this event is so low that detailed emergency plans for the outline planning zone are not proportionate and commensurate to the risk. However, in view of the need for some pre-planning to be carried out to achieve effective implementation should the need arise, the Secretary of State has determined the Outline Planning Zone (OPZ) at 5km.

The zone extends to 5km in all directions around the DEPZ but following an emergency it is anticipated that the requirement for protective actions would be confined to the downwind sector only.

The factors which would cause outline planning to be triggered include technical assessments of the emergency or monitoring results suggesting urgent protective actions were required to a distance greater than the extend of the detailed emergency planning zone.

10.4.1 MAP OF OUTLINE PLANNING ZONE



10.5 APPENDIX 5: RECORDS AND REGISTRATION

10.5.1 RECORDS TO BE KEPT

Comprehensive records are to be kept by all agencies involved in a nuclear emergency in order that the necessary information may be available for a subsequent inquiry to the cause and effects. The records are also needed to assist in dealing with any claims which may arise in connection with loss, damage or injury attributable to the emergency. In particular, the following information is required:

- a) Times of reports or orders being given or received
- b) Times when other authorities are informed of occurrences
- c) Details of persons exposed to any hazard and doses received, if possible, in addition to their movements within affected areas
- d) Decisions taken and the information on which these decisions were based
- e) Weather conditions

10.5.2 REGISTRATION OF PERSONS AFFECTED BY A NUCLEAR EMERGENCY

To provide evidence for possible claims for compensation many years after the occurrence of an emergency, members of the public will be able to register the fact that they were in the affected area at the time of the OSNE. Details will be promulgated by the MOD when appropriate.

10.5.3 PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMS, DAMAGE OR LOSS

The general arrangements which apply to the handling of claims and compensation in the event of injury or damage arising from a nuclear emergency are the responsibility of the MOD.

10.6 APPENDIX 6: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Term	Definition
<i>Averted Dose</i>	The radiation dose avoided by taking protective action.
<i>Automatic Protective Action Zone (APAZ)</i>	Area immediately surrounding the incident where immediate on-site protective actions are implemented automatically.
<i>Berth Safety Statement (BSS)</i>	A site-specific assessment of external hazards and operational conditions at a berth, supporting the nuclear risk assessment.
<i>Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)</i>	UK Government facility used for coordinating the national response to major emergencies.
<i>Category 1 Responders</i>	Organisations at the core of emergency response (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS).
<i>Category 2 Responders</i>	Supporting organisations (e.g. utilities and regulators) with duties to cooperate and share information.
<i>Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004</i>	UK legislation setting out responsibilities for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery.

<i>Command and Control (C2)</i>	Structure and processes used by responding organisations to direct, coordinate, and manage an emergency response.
<i>Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ)</i>	Area around the site where urgent protective actions are pre-planned to protect the public.
<i>Director of Public Health (DPH)</i>	Senior NHS official responsible for providing public health advice, including recommending protective actions.
<i>Effective Dose</i>	A measure of radiation exposure used to estimate overall risk to the body.
<i>Emergency Alert System</i>	UK Government system used to send urgent warnings and instructions to the public via mobile devices.
<i>Emergency Exposure</i>	Radiation exposure above normal limits permitted under controlled conditions to save life or prevent escalation.
<i>Emergency Support Centre (ESC)</i>	Facility providing shelter, welfare, and support for displaced or affected members of the public.
<i>Exclusion Zone Reception Centre (EZRC)</i>	Facility used to receive, process, and support evacuees from the immediate hazard area.
<i>Fission Products</i>	Radioactive substances produced by nuclear reactions that may pose hazards if released.
<i>Forward Control Point (FCP)</i>	Location near the incident where on-scene coordination is carried out.

<i>Gamma Shine</i>	Gamma radiation emitted from radioactive material contained within a source, such as a vessel.
<i>Gold / Silver / Bronze Command</i>	UK emergency command structure: Strategic (Gold), Tactical (Silver), and Operational (Bronze).
<i>Health Physics Advisor</i>	Specialist providing advice on radiation protection, monitoring, and safety measures.
<i>Inner Cordon</i>	Restricted area immediately surrounding the incident scene to control access and ensure safety.
<i>JESIP</i>	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles guiding multi-agency working.
<i>Local Resilience Partnership (LRP)</i>	Multi-agency partnership responsible for emergency planning and response at the local level.
<i>M/ETHANE</i>	Structured reporting format: Major incident, Exact location, Type, Hazards, Access, Number of casualties, Emergency services required.
<i>Media Briefing Centre (MBC)</i>	Location where coordinated media briefings are delivered during an incident.
<i>MOD Co-ordinating Authority (MCA)</i>	Senior MOD representative coordinating MOD response and advising civil authorities.
<i>NEBUST</i>	Nuclear Emergency Back Up Support Team providing specialist MOD support.
<i>NEMO</i>	Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Organisation responsible for radiation monitoring.

<i>Nuclear Steam Raising Plant (NSRP)</i>	Nuclear propulsion system used within a submarine.
<i>Off-Site Emergency Plan</i>	Multi-agency plan for managing impacts beyond the site boundary.
<i>Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE)</i>	Declared emergency requiring protective actions to protect the public beyond the site.
<i>Operational Berth (OB)</i>	Approved location for nuclear-powered warship operations.
<i>Outer Cordon</i>	Wider control area surrounding the inner cordon used to manage access and protect the public.
<i>Protective Actions</i>	Measures to reduce radiation exposure (e.g. sheltering, iodine, evacuation).
<i>Public Communications Group (PCG)</i>	Multi-agency group coordinating public information and media messaging.
<i>Radiation</i>	Energy emitted from radioactive materials that can cause harm.
<i>Radiation Hazard</i>	Risk from exposure to radiation without contamination.
<i>Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU)</i>	Facility used to monitor individuals for radioactive contamination and exposure.
<i>Radioactive Contamination</i>	Presence of radioactive material on or inside the body causing ongoing exposure.

<i>Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)</i>	Multi-agency group responsible for recovery planning and transition to normality.
<i>Reference Level</i>	Dose level at which protective actions should be considered to reduce risk.
<i>Regional Resilience Partnership (RRP)</i>	Strategic multi-agency group coordinating resilience across a wider region.
<i>REPIR</i>	Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2019.
<i>Rendezvous Point (RVP)</i>	Pre-determined location where responders assemble before deployment.
<i>SAGE</i>	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies providing national-level scientific advice.
<i>Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR)</i>	Facility used by Scottish Government to coordinate national response and support local responders.
<i>Sheltering</i>	Staying indoors with ventilation closed to reduce exposure to airborne contamination.
<i>Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC)</i>	Location where multi-agency strategic response is coordinated.
<i>Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)</i>	Senior group responsible for setting strategy and key decision-making during an incident.

<i>Stable Iodine Tablets (SITs)</i>	Tablets used to protect the thyroid from radioactive iodine exposure.
<i>Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)</i>	Group providing coordinated scientific and health advice to support decision-making.
<i>Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)</i>	Group responsible for implementing strategy and coordinating the tactical response.
<i>UKHSA</i>	United Kingdom Health Security Agency providing public health protection advice.
<i>Warning and Informing</i>	Duty to provide timely and accurate information to the public under REPPiR and the Civil Contingencies Act.